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Abstract 
From their previous research on regional and global company integration, the authors 
concluded that the management of the transition process has  a large impact on the 
successful outcome of the integration of the company's activities  and resources.  In 
this  paper,  it  is  examined  how  their  findings  on  the  process  management  aspect 
possibly apply to explicit cross border knowledge integration. 
The  author's  conclusions  on  the  transition  process  of  fostering  cross  border 
integration,  are  to  a large extent applicable to cross border knowledge management 
efforts as  well.  Some of the initial findings  seem to be even gaining relevance in a 
knowledge integration context. They have confronted this hypothesis with case studies 
of the knowledge management and integration processes in a number of companies, 
particularly McKinsey and Company and Alcatel as  compared to  empirical in-depth 
research at  Procter and Gamble.  They observed that careful management, planning 
and  monitoring  of  the  transition  process  of  a  multi-national  organization  with 
dispersed  knowledge  sources  towards  a  regionally  or  globally  integrated  network 
organization  with  cross  border leverage  of knowledge  and  learning,  is  crucial  to 
achieve successful knowledge integration. 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Knowledge management and integration 
While traditional strategy and management models concentrated on product market 
attractiveness and appropriate positioning of companies in the market and industry as 
a basis for  company success,  the  recent changes in the technological, political  and 
sociological environment of business have forced strategists to draw more attention to 
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strategy, the foundation for sustainable competitive advantage lies in  the current and 
future resource base, and especially the intangible and tacit resources, of the company! 
and its capability to grow and nurture them better and faster than the competition. 
In  light of this evolution, it is  no  surprise that research and framework development 
within  the  strategic  management  field  has  recently  embarked  on  a  'knowledge 
management route' . Knowledge is called 'the most strategically-significant resource of 
the firm' (Grant, 1996). 
As  a  consequence,  the  demand  for  innovative  and  integrative  capabilities  of the 
company  has  drastically  increased.  It is  frequently  heard  that  top  managers  are 
concerned about the pressure for  increasing sophistication and  specialization of the 
company's knowledge. In  addition, the ability to  share and coordinate the company 
specific  know-how,  learning  and  innovation  between  different  parts  of  the 
organization is acknowledged to be of increasing importance. Not only is knowledge 
the  crucial,  or even  sole,  base  for  competitive  advantage,  the  ability  to  share  the 
knowledge and learning, across functions and country borders, has grown out to be a 
'strategic  imperative'  for  any  (international)  company  in  the  1990s  (Bartlett  and 
Ghoshal,  1989). A recent article, entitled 'Making local knowledge global' is a clear 
illustration of the complexity and  difficulties,  and the cruciality of sharing learning 
and  know-how  across  country  borders  (Cerny,  1996).  The  role  of the  leader  and 
manager of the organization  has  evolved  accordingly  towards  'building a  learning 
organization' (Senge, 1995). 
1.2 Company integration 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) showed that in addition to the company's ability to exploit 
and leverage the worldwide learning, innovation and knowledge, global efficiency and 
local  responsiveness  are  key  success  factors  for  international  companies  (see  also 
figure  1).  The  art  of international  business  is  to  integrate  and coordinate,  cross-
functionally  and  across  country  borders,  the  company's  activities,  resources  and 
knowledge,  while  staying  or  becoming  locally  responsive.  It  has  been  frequently 
argued  that  the  pure  multi-domestic  approach,  with  its  widely  dispersed  and 
duplicated activities, resources and knowledge is completely outdated; an integrated 
and coordinated network approach to organization is required for success in the global 
Information Age. 
In  line with this view, today's business news is  overwhelmed with articles about the 
integration challenges of various companies, especially in  Europe. It seems that the 
recent  pushes  towards  more  deregulation,  market  convergence  and  liberalization 
(especially  within  the  European  market:  Europe  '1992',  the  European  Monetary 
Union, etc.), together with the overall globalization of the economy, have created new 
opportunities for increasing efficiency through coordination, and even centralization, 
of international activities and resources, and for worldwide and regional leveraging of 
innovation, learning and knowledge. 
While the specific drivers and requirements for internationalization and cross border 
integration may vary by industry and business (as discussed below), it is clear in these 
2 days that in most industries and companies, and especially those operating in Europe, 
more rather than less integration is required and many companies have only just begun 
to  make this  happen  in  their organizations.  Other have embarked much earlier but 
found many pitfalls and frustration. All of this is driven largely by lagging profitability 
(fragmentation;  duplication  of activities,  resources  and  knowledge;  and  Nlli (not 
invented here)  are  significant causes of this2), increasing customer pressure (follow 
the customer's internationalization or integration) and pressure on 'time to market'. 
While  various  researchers  have  taken  different  angles  and  perspectives  on  this 
company integration debate and extensive discussions about why (not) integrating and 
about the organizational requirements of an  integrated company structure have taken 
place,  relatively  little  research  has  been  conducted  on  the  management  issues  of 
company integration in a European or regional context. Even less attention has been 
paid to  a  related  question,  at  the  heart  of the  authors'  ongoing  research  : how  do 
companies  achieve  more  and  better  integration?  How  can  executives  manage  the 
transition from the existing organization to the new one?  How can they manage the 
process? 
1.3 Position of research 
In an  earlier contribution  (De  Koning,  Verdin  and  Williamson,  1997),  the  authors 
have focused  on  the  process  management issue.  One could indeed argue that their 
observations  so  far  have  focused  especially on  integration  per se  and  less  on  the 
learning  (which  refers  to  the  extent  of  world-wide  or  regional  leveraging  of 
innovation  and  knowledge,  as  indicated  on  figure  1  with  the  'learning'  axis). 
Nevertheless,  it  is  frequently  observed  that  opportunities  along  the  'learning'  axis 
have  been  the  most  important  in  driving  cross  border  integration  in  some  cases, 
especially  in  what  is  often  referred  to  as  multi-local  businesses.  Various  service 
businesses have embarked on explicit internationalization and integration, not because 
the key benefit for  them was  in  reducing costs  and/or eliminating  duplication,  but 
because primary opportunities and benefits for cross border learning exist (e.g. Vedior 
International case in the European temporary work services business (Van Heck and 
Verdin,  1996) and Eureko case in the European financial services industry (Freeman 
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Figure 1 : 
Managing Integration: The Strategic Imperatives 
Even  when  the  Integration  (or  Global  Efficiency)  axis  was  the  most  important 
dimension along which integration and internationalization was achieved, even then it 
turned out that initiatives  to  boost efficiency resulted  in  and/or  were supported by 
improvement of the worldwide learning. In that sense, one could consider the learning 
axis a dimension to push the integration for global efficiency on. 
While some of the  objects  we  initially observed had only implicit (or at least less 
explicit)  consequences  for  the  knowledge  integration,  the  question  remains  if the 
initial findings, mostly although certainly not exclusively, collected from integration 
cases  with  the objective to  increase the  global  efficiency,  apply  when  the  explicit 
objective is to better integrate knowledge, innovation and learning. In other words, the 
authors  see  knowledge  and  learning  broader  than  solely  as  a  dimension  to  push 
integration on. The question under consideration in this contribution is  : what can be 
learned from the observations in company integration and management of the process, 
for making cross border knowledge management and integration happen? 
Although the observations were not limited to  company integration  in Europe,  the 
issue  seems  particularly  'hot'  in  a  European  context.  Corporate  Europe  has  been 
experiencing drastic changes in its business environment and were hence exposed to 
various  opportunities  for  cross  border  leveraging  of  the  company  knowledge, 
dispersed around European and worldwide subsidiaries. 
Recent research has recognized strong regional (for example European) organizations 
as a key step in the globalization process (Malnight, 1996). The authors would argue, 
however, that strong regional organizations have a role beyond a proverbial "transit 
stop" on the road to full globalization. As  the world seems to be polarizing into ever 
stronger  and  more  articulated  regional  trading  blocs,  the  importance  of regional 
strategy and organization building has been recognized as  an increasingly significant 
goal in its own right (witness the early calls made e.g. by Morrison, Ricks and Roth, 
4 1991)  and not just as  some  'transitory'  state from  national to  global  organizations 
(This point is further developed in De Koning, Subramanian and Verdin, 1997). 
The authors  used a longitudinal case study methodology to  explore the  managerial 
process shifting from national subsidiaries to  global or regional organizations.  The 
core of the initial research project originated from in-depth field research at Procter & 
Gamble  Europe  (Bartlett,  De  Koning  and  Verdin,  1997)3,  together  with  other 
integration examples like 3M (Van Heck and Verdin,  1996). The observations  and 
findings from this were checked and deepened making use of other case studies which 
had more emphasis on the learning and knowledge integration agenda: McKinsey and 
Company (Bartlett,  1996) and A1catel  (Bonheure and De Meyer,  1992 ; Bogaert, De 
Meyer  and  Verdin,  1997).  All  these  served  as  the  basis  for  the  investigation  and 
allowed to  build a richer understanding of the complex organizational changes that 
lead the  way for  the  creation of integrated organizations,  worldwide  as  well  as  in 
Europe. 
Describing  some  of the  insights  gained  and  lessons  learned  from  their  ongoing 
research,  the  authors  build a  framework  to  help  managers  understand  the ways  in 
which their chosen process of knowledge integration influences the final outcome, to 
layout the different options that are available, and to help them make choices both in 
terms of achieving their organizational goals  and identifying efficient and effective 
mechanisms for getting there. As the existing 'old' sources of competitive advantage 
(like  differentiation  or  cost  leadership)  have  faded,  few  managers  need  to  be 
convinced about the importance of knowledge and the creation of it. Or as  one said: 
"The  belief  is  that  the  process  by  which  knowledge  is  created  and  utilized  in 
organizations may be the inimitable resource for creating sustainable rents" (Schendel, 
1996).  Hence  the  interest  in  understanding  how  to  make  knowledge  integration 
happen. 
1.4 The critical role of process: How to get there? 
Integration in global or regional blocs is often far less easily achieved than planned. 
Initial responses by many companies have  led to the creation of global  or regional 
headquarters,  and integrating some parts of the value chain or by introducing some 
kind of cross border task forces  (e.g.  'Euro-teams', activity groups  or coordination 
centers; SchUtte,  1996). But in practice, few companies have achieved a high level of 
European  integration  simply  by  adopting  these  kinds  of initiatives  (Bleackley  & 
Williamson,  1995)4 or have succeeded at all.  Integration requires a great deal more 
than redrawing the organizational boxes or creating new ones. 
Some companies have chosen a slow but steady route to integration and have spent an 
impressive amount of time and energy to  reach  results which could probably have 
been achieved much more quickly and more efficiently. Some decided, being forced 
by crisis, to drastically reorganize into cross-border structures. Others enthusiastically 
headed down the road to integration only to find out that they have become stranded 
half-way towards their goal; stuck in the middle as  neither fish nor fowl. Still others 
emphasize the unexpectedly high cost of integration, in terms of the time and effort 
required.  The  general  consensus  is  that  actually  capturing  the  benefits  of highly-
5 integrated organizations turns  out to  be much more difficult than  imagining how  a 
shiny, new global or regional configuration should look. 
The authors believe that a large part of the problem can be traced back to insufficient 
attention to the planning and implementation of the process of integration as  well as 
the  overall  framework  within  which  it  is  to  take  place.  The  importance  of the 
processes  deployed  to  promote greater interaction has  recently  been  flagged  in  the 
context  of headquarters-subsidiary  relations  and  the  role  of regional  headquarters 
(Shtitte,  1996).  Going beyond questions  of the  position  and  the  role of regional  or 
global headquarters within multinationals, they find the issue of what road should be 
traveled and how when changing the organization, is critical in a broader context. 
These  findings  are  in  line  with  research  results  on  integration  of  mergers  and 
acquisitions which show how important preparation and execution of the integration 
process is for achieving the intended synergies and worldwide learning (Haspeslagh 
and Jemison, 1991).  In the broader field of corporate strategy, a growing literature on 
corporate  transformation  focuses  on  the  importance,  the  effectiveness  and  the 
requirements  of alternative change processes  (Strebel,  1994;  Kotter,  1995;  Rumelt, 
1995;  Chakravarthy,  1996).  The  authors  agree  with  these  researchers  that change 
processes have "path dependent qualities":  in  other words,  that  the  pace,  type,  and 
style of initiatives have an  impact both on what types  of outcomes  companies can 
achieve, and their relative success in reaching their goals. 
2. Cases 
Described below  is  'a  European  integration'  example  with  the  P&G  Europe  case, 
while  global  knowledge  integration  is  the  central  theme  in  the  McKinsey  and 
Company  and Alcatel case. Although more often the best insights can be gained from 
studying failures and pitfalls like Alcatel's struggle to integrate the company, the cases 
below want to illustrate how the effective combination of various management aspects 
within some companies like McKinsey and Company resulted in a knowledge focused 
and integrated organization. In addition, these cases allow to illustrate the importance 
of knowledge management and integration in different kinds of industries. lllustrated 
by these cases, the key findings will be elaborated on in the third part. Complementary 
examples will be indicated in that section as well. 
2.1 Integrating Europe at P &G 
P&G moved into the European markets in  1932,  starting with a u.K. acquisition. In 
the mid-1950s, P&G expanded into continental Europe. In these early stages of P&G's 
internationalization, each  subsidiary was  structured as  a microcosm of P&G in  the 
U.S.A., including the full range of functions.  Each P&G General Manager in Europe 
had a mission to  adapt P&G's proven products for their local country market, and to 
use P&G's brand management approach to gain leadership in the local market. 
P&G had only a small European headquarters to overview the subsidiary activity. One 
major role  of the  headquarters  was  managing the  trademarks  and brand names  for 
Europe. 
6 By  1970,  P&G  had  achieved  a  significant  presence  in  most  Western  European 
countries, although the relative market position and product range varied widely from 
country  to  country.  However,  P&G  executives  were  not  satisfied  with  these 
achievements.  P&G  Europe  was  under  pressure  from  corporate  headquarters  in 
Cincinnati  to  improve  financial  performance:  better  economies  of scale,  speed  to 
market, transfer of successful ideas, and overall effectiveness became important.  A 
new European perspective to solve these problems was called for. 
P&G decided  to  establish  the  European  Technical  Center  (ETC)  in  Brussels,  and 
initially the  main  focus  of ETC was  on  common  development programs.  The first 
attempt for  a better European coordination, however,  proved disastrous.  Thereafter, 
P&G Europe  hesitated  to  force  the  country  managers  to  adopt  new  policies  and 
instead, a more voluntary approach to integration was adopted. 
P&G's  voluntary  approach  to  integration  was  implemented  by  the  formation  of 
diverse project teams through which it created an ad hoc, matrix structure. R&D was 
the first function to take a clear step towards European integration.  In 1977, European 
Technical Teams were introduced with  the  goal  of reducing the development costs 
and leveraging the  particular  strong  product  capabilities  owned by  the  local  R&D 
departments.  P&G  continued  to  build  on  this  initiative  through  the  1980s  with  a 
number of informal structures (such as lead country responsibility for specific brands, 
etc.). None the less, most of the R&D  staff were located in the country subsidiaries 
and reported to the local country managers who paid their salaries. 
From the marketing side, many European initiatives were started as well. Euro Brand 
Teams,  drawing  from  the  country marketing  managers,  were  created  to  deal  with 
specific issues.  In  the early  1980s, Euro Brand Teams  (e.g.  Vizir) membership was 
essentially  voluntary  and  hence  turnover  in  the  teams  very  high.  Using  'center  of 
excellence' logic, teams were led by a country-based marketing or country manager. 
Team  decisions  were  all  subject  to  ratification  (and  adaptation!)  by  the  country 
organizations,  which  continued  to  keep  P&L  responsibility  and  remained  the  key 
arena for career development. 
The project teams gradually included and were later led by the fast-growing cadre of 
ETC  staff and  senior  management.  By the  end  of the  1980s,  team  decisions  had 
become  less  and  less  negotiable.  As  a next  step  in  the  integration  process,  P&G 
gradually centralized many functions, shifting reporting relationships from the country 
general manager to  European management and executives  (often moving through  a 
matrix structure as  an  intermediate stage). This happened at  different points in  time 
for the different functions. The earliest steps were taken by the R&D function, already 
in  1977. By  1989, centralization was largely completed. The same process was used 
first  in  Purchasing,  then  in  Manufacturing,  and  Engineering  for  all  of  Europe. 
Functional executives used this change process to  leverage the new critical mass for 
greater  effectiveness  and  efficiency.  R&D,  for  example,  grouped  researchers  by 
product categories, rather than countries and  brands, to  improve focus,  learning and 
productivity. None of these changes happened without  pain or frustration, even if (as 
in  R&D)  the  pressure  for  knowledge  sharing  was  clear,  the  benefits  obvious  and 
'buyable' by all. 
7 As  a result, by 1990, the role of the general and other country managers had changed 
dramatically:  with  fewer  functions  and  less  autonomy,  the  general  managers  were 
given greater responsibility for public and government relations, as well as continuing 
strong focus on the sales and marketing aspects of the business. Within a decade, they 
were forced  to  depend on  a pan-European organization for product supply,  product 
development  and consumer research,  and  also  to  absorb  the  allocated costs  of the 
system. While P&L responsibility remained fully theirs for a long time,  a system of 
shared responsibility and performance measurement was now being put in place. 
Overview of  integration process. 
The changes in P&G Europe and the country organizations represented a fundamental 
shift  in  P&G's  structure  and  culture.  Years  later,  the  changes  seem  logical,  yet 
executives and managers throughout P&G often recall the many doubts and passionate 
debates that surrounded the shift.  At one level, the process of integration looks like 
emergent strategy and 'muddling through'. Yet, in retrospect, one can see a coherence 
in the many major and minor decisions which drove integration forward. 
P&G's  early  organization  in  Europe  was  a  lose  federation  of autonomous  country 
organizations, within the International Division.  European perspective was  virtually 
invisible, know-how and innovations  were  almost exclusively American.  As  P&G's 
leadership moved towards a regional organization, the vision was not fixed to dates or 
a specific structure. Two streams of decisions evolved from that point, one building a 
European perspective and cross-national coordinating abilities, and the other building 
a unified European infrastructure of information technology, finance,  incentives and 
other essentials.  This  infrastructure  supported the  broader coordination  of business 
and  knowledge  and  allowed  managers  to  become  adept  at  communicating  across 
cultural  barriers  and  to  gain  a  practical  knowledge  of the  specifics  of different 
markets.  By  beginning  early,  and  holding  a  long-term  vision,  P&G  was  able  to 
succeed in both aspects, while continuing to build revenues and profits. 
The  main  vehicle  for  building  the  European  perspective  and  capabilities  among 
managers was  through cross-national ad hoc structure of project teams. These teams 
began  as  voluntary  projects,  and  over  the  years  shifted  to  a  standard  and  formal 
structure led by ETC management. 
By then, sufficient time had passed to ensure that the new country managers had been 
groomed in the new system and the old country managers had either left or moved up 
and on to become part of the new integrated European organization. 
Although the main challenge for P&G was to improve its position on the integration 
axis (see figure  1)  (e.g. through coordinating and centralizing purchasing, R&D, and 
other), there can referred to some observations particularly of interest in the context of 
the current investigation. First of all, it turned out that the knowledge management or 
R&D function, was not only the first function to be integrated but with hindsight, can 
be considered key for the (success of the)  overall integration process. One could say 
that some of the knowledge and R&D  integration initiatives acted as  'catalysts'  (as 
discussed below) for the integration in various other functions and fields.  Vice versa, 
it is clearly distinguished that the overall integration has  affected P&G's position on 
8 worldwide  learning  as  well.  Although  one  could  consider  the  improvements  in 
worldwide or regional learning as a coincidental by-product of the overall integration, 
it seems that in the process, the improvements of the regional learning not just popped 
up but have supported the overall agenda of company integration. 
As  a result of P&G's integration efforts, the time-to-market, quality of products, cost 
basis  and  competitive position  of the  company improved.  In  addition,  the  flow  of 
knowledge and innovation(s) has drastically changed over time: first,  from one way 
transfer of know-how from the American headquarters in the direction of Europe, to 
two  way transfer  ; and  second,  from  local  country-based know-how  to  shared  and 
coordinated, pan-European learning. 
2.2 Integrating knowledge at McKinsey and Company 
Since its  beginning in  1926,  McKinsey's  image  in  the  market  had evolved from  a 
company of "business doctors and efficiency experts" towards a highly respected and 
well  established consulting firm  in  the  1950s-60s.  Their international network had 
quickly expanded in the  1960s and resulted in a solid presence in Europe and North 
America. 
By the 1970s however McKinsey was observed to be an 'elite firm unable to meet the 
client demands'. Their consultants were believed excellent generalist problem solvers 
but lacked the deep industry knowledge and specialized expertise, necessary to meet 
the  client's  rising  expectations.  In addition,  aggressive  challengers  like  the Boston 
Consulting Group, emerged in the consulting market. The pressure from the market 
and  competition  has  initiated  a  long  process  of  knowledge  management  and 
integration within the company. 
A committee of the most respected peers in the company was  assigned to  study the 
problems and make recommendations. In 1971, one of the first things they suggested 
was to position the consultants of the company in the future as  'T-shaped' consultants. 
This  meant  that  their broad  general  background would be complemented  with  in-
depth knowledge and expertise in one industry or functional area. 
Ron Daniel, who became Managing Director of the company in  1976,  drove up the 
pace  of implementation  of the  committee's  report  and  installed  Clientele  Sectors. 
These organizations centralized the company's experience and know-how in specific 
industries  (like  banking,  consumer  products,  etc.)  and  acted  in  a  sort  of matrix 
structure  with  the  traditional  geographically  organized  offices.  He  also  started 
initiatives  for  more  formal  development  of functional  expertise.  He  assembled 
working groups around two key areas, namely strategy and organization. Local experts 
were  asked  to  lead those  working groups,  for example Fred Gluck, from  the  New 
York office, was responsible for the strategy group. Throughout the company various 
concerns about these initiatives were raised: people did not want to compromise the 
local presence they had build up in the past. 
By  the  early  1980s,  Gluck  had  become  the  internal  champion  of the  knowledge 
integration initiatives. The next step  was  the creation of 15  Centers of Competence 
around  existing  functional  expertise  (marketing,  change  management,  etc.).  The 
9 centers were headed by practice leaders and aimed to help develop consultants and to 
concentrate on continuous renewal of the intellectual competencies of the company. 
The  centers  were  meant  to  complement  the  personal  networks  of the  individual 
consultants,  not  to  replace  them.  The  widely  communicated  message,  via  endless 
meetings  and  discussions,  was  to  emphasize knowledge  creation,  management and 
integration within the company, and not only to  leverage existing know-how  in  the 
market. The culture had to be changed from mere 'client' development towards 'client 
and  practice  development'.  In addition,  the  Practice  Bulletins  were  introduced  to 
facilitate the diffusion of important findings and ideas around the company. 
Gluck soon wondered if no further organizational changes were to be made in order to 
support the process. A project team was  started in  1987.  They proposed a common 
data base of knowledge within the company to  be  installed and to  hire a full  time 
practice  coordinator for  each  'practice  area'  (client  sector  and  competence  center). 
They would bear the responsibility for the quality and accessibility of the data base. In 
addition,  the  team  emphasized  the  importance  of  the  specialist  consultants  and 
suggested to  enhance their position within the company (in relation to  the T  -shaped 
consultants). 
These  recommendations  led  to  the  introduction  of Practice  Development Network 
(PDNet), a computer based assembly of documents representing the core knowledge 
found around the company; and the Knowledge Resource Directory, a sort of Yellow 
Pages, serving as  a directory of all the experts and key documents. The key problem 
was to solve the issue of the specialist consultants' status. 
In 1988, the same year Gluck became MD, a Clientele and Professional Development 
Committee (CPDC) was installed and took over Gluck's personal role in championing 
the  practice  development  and  knowledge  integration  agenda  of the  company.  The 
Committee observed that the original group of 11  sectors and  15  centers had grown 
out to  'islands of activity' and 'fiefdoms ruled by experts'. The proposal was  made to 
integrate the existing groups into seven sectors and seven functional capability groups. 
A  lot  of  people  interpreted  this  move  as  centralization  and  adding  another 
organizational layer. 
The  CPDC concretized the  suggestion  for  improvement  of the  specialists'  internal 
position,  through  the  introduction  of multiple  career  paths  within  the  company. 
Despite these initiatives, a lot of skepticism and confusion remained. 
In 1994, Rajat Gupta took over as new MD of the company. After listening to various 
comments on  the knowledge integration initiatives and the  status of the integration 
agenda, Gupta decided to push it one step further, through a combination of measures. 
He commented: 'The firm did not have to  make a choice, we  had to  pursue all the 
options'. 
First,  he  committed  the  company  to  the  investments  made  in  the  centers  of 
competence and industry sectors. Second,  after a successful try-out in  Germany, he 
decided to organize worldwide Practice Olympics as  a competition between different 
teams  on the basis of their ideas  presented to  a jury of senior partners  and clients. 
Third,  he  started  diverse  special initiatives,  meant  to  let  senior  partners  work  on 
10 emerging issues within the management of companies. Last but not least, he expanded 
the McKinsey Global Institute as  a research center focusing on the consequences of 
the  global  economy on  business,  leading  to  another  center,  the  Change  Center,  in 
1995. 
Overview of  integration process. 
The actions towards knowledge integration in McKinsey and Company were clearly 
initiated  by  the  customers  and  competitors.  The  commitment  of  successive  MDs 
within the company to this agenda and the involvement of the individual consultants 
via  various  discussions  and  working  groups  seems  to  have  contributed  to  the 
successful integration of the worldwide offices' know-how and knowledge. 
The knowledge integration process within McKinsey and Company was characterized 
by initially a slow and later on exponential institutionalization process: starting from 
a few initiatives of ad hoc working groups aiming to coordinate the information flow, 
towards  various  projects  led by  selfstanding  organizational units  created  and  fully 
responsible for the exchange and coordination of the company knowledge.  Another 
characteristic  of the integration  process  of the  company,  was  the  slow  but steady 
evolution  towards  a  company  culture  and  long  term  career  development  focused 
primarily on knowledge creation and integration. 
2.3 Crossing borders at Alcatel 
Alcatel NV is the result of the merger of CGE's and ITT's telecom activities in 1986. 
Despite attempts to  present a European rather than French image,  the company was 
from the beginning typically characterized by decentralized management with most 
decision making  and  power located  in  the  national  subsidiaries.  In theory,  Alcatel 
implemented a matrix organization in which the product responsibility (development 
and marketing) was in  hands of the 5 Business Units (basically product groups, like 
e.g.  Network Services group),  while sales and profits  were the responsibility of the 
national subsidiaries. However, it was widely known within and outside the company 
that the country managers were 'mighty kings in their national kingdoms'. 
Product development responsibility was  assigned on  a  'center of competence' basis 
and  was  totally  unrelated  to  the  sales  responsibility.  Usually,  the  subsidiary  that 
developed the product, ended up  manufacturing it as  well (e.g.  due to different CAD 
systems in the subsidiaries). 
Alcatel  had  tried  to  address  the  issue  of better  cross  functional  integration  and 
coordination of the R&D,  manufacturing and  sales  with the installation of the  SDI 
center. The center was a coordinative mechanism that was intended to link the product 
development  and  manufacturing.  The  communication  and  interaction ·between  the 
marketing  and  product  development  side  was  still  ignored,  not  to  mention  the 
problems  with  the overall  responsibility for  the  development projects  because of a 
lack of project managers and management. It was  clear that the issue of functional 
integration needed a better answer than the SDI center. 
11 In  1988,  the  French  subsidiary  Alcate1-CIT  announced  the  introduction  of  the 
concepts  'Product Life Cycle'  (PLC)  and 'Trio'. PLC  was  a procedural information 
gathering  and  distribution  system  which  spanned  the  entire  life  of a  product  in 
development,  until  it went to  the  market.  It  described the  flow  of information  and 
reports  required,  people  involved  at  the  different  stages  and  especially  the 
responsibility at various points in time.  Especially for this latter aspect, the Trio was 
created. The Trio was a project management team consisting of three members with 
different roles to fulfill in the course of the development of the product. 
Although it was meant to  be gradually implemented and  supported by a number of 
pilot projects and formal training, it seemed that the implementation of the PLC and 
Trio did not go  as  smoothly as hoped for.  Some managers felt threatened and closely 
monitored,  some others  saw  their job contents change significantly and  still  others 
complained that the managers within the Trios lacked formal authority. 
These problems were even more explicit in the international context. Taking the initial 
idea of PLC and Trios, Alcatel NV decided to implement the concepts globally within 
the Line Transmission Group (part of the Network Services Business Unit). But the 
French  innovation  did  not  address  how  the  various  national  Trios  could  be 
coordinated and integrated. For example, one issue was that the national departments 
(R&D,  manufacturing and marketing)  had started communicating through the Trio, 
but  concerning  the  international  coordination,  one  could  hardly  expect  the  R&D 
department in country A to communicate with the sales department of country B. And 
even worse, it turned out that the various R&D departments seriously misunderstood 
each other in various situations. Despite the existence of a Central Product Manager 
(who  headed one of the  product lines of a Business Unit and brought the different 
national Trios together regularly), there was a clear lack of formal project coordination 
on an international scale. The P&L responsibility remained with the country managers 
who  in the best cases lacked accurate information for  taking optimal decisions  and 
often had diverging priorities. 
The consequence was that several development projects were seriously delayed. Due 
to  early project failures,  people  were  less  and  less  excited  about  the  international 
coordination and blamed each other for the various problems that showed up.  Some 
complained that the numerous meetings with the different national Trios were time-
consuming, not to mention the time spent on the various reports that were supposed to 
be drawn up and the endless communication that was neither effective, nor efficient. 
The  international  Trio  experiment  was  followed  by  some  other  cross  border 
integration  projects,  but  basically  the  key  issue  remained  the  same  :  the  country 
managers were still very independent and the attempts to break their power had by and 
large failed. 
While  earlier attempts  to  gradually  tilt  the  matrix  (like  in  Philips)  had  failed,  the 
company went into a severe crisis and hence the need for a drastic reorganization was 
clearly felt. At the end of 1995,  the company created Business Divisions (split up on 
the basis of technology) which became the key organizational units, with clear formal 
power and  responsibilities.  The  regional  dimension  was  not completely erased but 
12 became clearly  less  important.  Some  of the  country  managers  became  head  of a 
Business Division. 
13 Overview of  integration process 
Although  the  initial  steps  taken  aimed  to  boost  the  cross  functional  knowledge 
integration, the Trio and PLC were later transferred to the international scene, in order 
to boost the cross-border integration. The decision itself explains part of the problems 
encountered during its implementation: by copying the concepts to the international 
platform, the drawbacks of the system, as  observed on a national level, were simply 
enlarged. The key problems were: people felt threatened and were not ready to set the 
steps  towards  integration;  those who  wanted  to  do  it,  missed  the required  support 
(culture,  HRM)  and  formal  authorization  ;  the  country  managers  remained  very 
powerful and had only a national perspective. The initial implementation problems of 
the  Trio  in  France  already  indicated  the  difficulties  in  making  the  system  work 
internationally. Alcatel underestimated the formalization of the approach: the endless 
meetings and reporting attempted to formalize the integration, but it clearly did not 
happen just like that. 
The Trio has initiated a change in the corporate thinking at Alcatel and resulted in 
maybe modest improvement in the company integration,  as  well  across  borders  as 
across  functions.  The key problem of the Trio was  that it was  completely isolated 
from the existing structure and organization. One could indeed wonder if the Trio was 
not a good first step (an informal working group trying to prepare the organization), 
which in the end failed because it was not followed by the necessary formalization of 
the cross border coordination. Under pressure from the market, Alcatel finally had to 
drastically  break  with  its  traditional  geographically  oriented  organization  and 
structure,  since the  smooth transition  route  seemed to  have failed.  The future  will 
provide  an  answer  to  the  question  if  the  current  organization  is  sufficiently 
competence or knowledge driven. 
3. Key findings 
In the following paragraphs, some tentative hypotheses will be put forward on how 
explicit attention to  knowledge  integration might affect the previous  findings  with 
regard to  the integration process and the integration initiatives implemented within 
that process. 
3.1 Pacing the Integration Process: Shock Therapy, or Slow and Steady? 
A  growing  stream  of research  on  corporate  transformation  raises  the  question  of 
whether transformations should be effected quickly, or slowly.  Working with a model 
of radical change they term "punctuated equilibrium", Tushman and Romanelli posit 
that  corporate  transformations,  because  they  affect  all  the  fundamentals  of  an 
organization,  should  occur  quickly  (Tushman  &  Romanelli,  1985).  Organization 
systems, they argue, are tight configurations of reinforcing patterns, and tweaking the 
system to achieve change simply does not work.  In sharp contrast, others argue that a 
slower pace (as  much as  ten years)  makes more sense. They contend that changing 
requirements for skills and even more importantly, the need to build and retain trust, 
require a more patient approach (Kim & Mauborgne, 1996). 
14 Both approaches were observed in the companies we initially researched.  P&G has 
followed the twenty year plan, building trust, organizational capability, and ensuring 
changes were positive with a substantial part of limited experimentation.  By contrast, 
3M Europe  opted for  shock  therapy.  The change  was  implemented  quickly,  even 
ahead  of schedule,  possibly  even  to  the  short-term  detriment  of employees  and 
customers. Many employees had been involved in discussions about the problems that 
would arise if the company failed to integrate; nearly everyone in 3M Europe agreed 
that integration was  the  way to  go.  With widespread support for  the  changes,  the 
general sentiment was that dragging out the awkward in-between stages would be too 
distracting  for  everyone.  Arguably,  both  approaches  were  successful  for  the 
companies involved. 
Applying this  to  the  observations  within  McKinsey  and  Company  and  Alcatel,  it 
seems that McKinsey explicitly decided to  take the long route. They gradually build 
consensus  about  the  need for  knowledge  integration  and  took  one  step  at  a  time 
(although they drove up the pace when consensus seemed to be established, see later). 
The question remains however whether the shock therapy (like 3M) is feasible  and 
possible within the knowledge integration context. The authors have the impression 
that knowledge integration requires a long and steady process of building consensus, 
while leaving the option open for some 'shock projects'  in the meantime (the long 
route  as  a  sequence  of  smaller  shock  projects  or  sprints).  Although  in  some 
circumstances (e.g. near bankruptcy or severe shareholder pressure) slow change may 
not be feasible (Strebel,  1994), the question remains whether the pure shock therapy 
can be considered an option to implement better cross-border learning. 
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"Shock Therapy" vs. "Slow and Steady" 
15 Despite being polar extremes,  both the  "shock therapy"  and the "slow and  steady" 
approaches  share  one  thing  in  common:  they  minimize  the  trauma  and  confusion 
associated with fundamental  change.  In  the shock therapy,  because the changes  are 
implemented  rapidly,  people  can  settle  down  to  learn  the  new  systems  relatively 
quickly (up to two years). The change may be cathartic, but any confusion and trauma 
is  short-lived.  Under the  slow  and steady approach,  most changes occur following 
discussion,  debate,  and  experimentation.  Relatively little  resistance  is  created and 
where  it  does  arise,  the  organization  can  take  the  time  to  counter  or bypass  the 
resistance  that  might  otherwise  blossom.  Within  McKinsey  and  Company,  the 
recommendations of the committee installed in  1971, were only slowly implemented 
from 1976 on when Ron Daniel took over the MD position. The five years in between 
had given the individual consultants the time to learn and live with the suggestions for 
a more integrated approach that was suggested and required. 
Which of these routes will be most effective in a particular situation depends on the 
pressure of the market (competitive or bottom line pressure) and on how powerful the 
resistance  encountered  will  be.  The  slow  and  steady  approach  is  preferable  for 
companies whose challenge lies primarily in natural inertia or resistance in the system 
(as  is  often  the  case  for  specific  knowledge integration efforts),  rather  than  active 
hostility. In this case, an initial program of incremental change may provide the basis 
for a more important or crucial change to take place later. 
The companies opting for a "medium" pace of change seemed to  experience all the 
trauma and confusion of the short-term fundamental change, without the benefit of a 
quick shock to overcome organizational resistance. On the other hand, the change was 
too quick to allow true evolution of attitudes, responsibilities and capabilities among 
managers. The result was  a greater tendency to  retreat to  the  old structure,  making 
little or no progress towards integration. It is observed that these companies often got 
stuck in the middle between the two types of change processes because management 
had not explicitly made the necessary trade-offs and choices, and therefore were not 
able to manage the critical weaknesses inherent in either approach. 
For example, for years Akatel (and others like Philips and IBM) had been trying to 
"tilt  their  matrix"  and  foster  more  cross  border  cooperation  in  Europe  without 
significant success. Akatel expected the installation of Trios to be a one time shot and 
did not plan to take additional steps : they were prepared for neither the quick route 
nor  for  the  longer  term  integration  process.  It took  some  time  (and  failures  of 
integration projects) and a severe crisis to finally make major inroads into the stifling 
power of the country baronies. Akatel, like some of the other examples mentioned, 
seem become stuck in the middle for quite some time (see Figure 2). 
Whatever path is chosen it has to be carefully prepared and monitored. In the absence 
of such preparation, the quick route becomes dirty, the slow and steady route involves 
high costs for little result leading to  lots  of frustration  and even more resistance to 
change in the future.  This was the case in the Akatel example: they had not carefully 
planned and prepared the organization for the integration process, which resulted in 
frustration and poor performance. 
16 3.2 Build Capacity for Integration First. 
The next important question is how management can 'prepare the way'  for change as 
required,  whether choosing the  shock therapy or the  slow  and  steady  route?  The 
importance of the  involvement of people  and  the  need  to  build a learning  culture 
before  implementing  the  changes,  are  important  steps  on  the  way  to  successful 
integration. 
Preparing the scene: the more involvement, the less need for 'implementation '. 
First, the authors  observed that participation in  discussion before the  actual  change 
took place is important. P&G, McKinsey and 3M had a deep commitment to extensive 
discussion and tried to reach an overall shared purpose, even if individual decisions 
may have appeared haphazard. The approach mirrors the research on Japanese change 
management,  where it was  observed that much more time was  spent in  discussions 
throughout  the  organization  than  in  American  companies,  yet  changes  were 
implemented much faster.  Overall, the Japanese had less resistance and more efficient 
changes. Likewise, P&G, McKinsey and 3M have had significantly fewer problems 
adjusting than Akate1, which initially involved a few people in the set-up of the Trios 
and  PLCs  but  overlooked  involving  people  (especially  the  country  managers)  in 
implementing the concepts internationally. The importance of this preparation phase 
for  successful  integration  parallels  that  observed  in  successful  mergers  and 
acquisitions (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991) or other strategy processes. It is important 
to generate a common perception and buy-in especially from those that will be most 
involved in producing the intended results or affected by them. 
17 Deceptively rapid formulation, 
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Creating the culture: learning by doing. 
Second,  the  apparently  ad  hoc  task forces  and  discussions  ('soft'  structures)  put in 
place  before  implementing  the  integrated  structures  allowed  managers  within 
McKinsey,  P&G  and  3M  to  develop  the  necessary  skills  and  the  organizational 
capacity for  the  new  structure.  During the  1980s,  for  example,  P&G marketing 
managers  participated  in  numerous  European  projects,  either  as  leaders  or  team 
members. During the long integration path within McKinsey and Company, several 
working  groups  have  been  called together to  make  suggestions  and  solve  specific 
problems  of knowledge  coordination.  3M  used  European  executives  without  line 
authority, based in  Brussels,  to  encourage country managers  to  build consensus on 
strategies.  These processes preceded formal restructuring in these organizations5, and 
were necessary to build the capacity for cross-national perspectives and management 
skills.  This is where Alcatel took a different approach: although they initially created 
what seemed to  be ad hoc  working groups  (Trios)  which could have been used as 
catalysts for further integration initiatives, they never formalized their initiatives and 
left  these  Trios  out  of the  existing  organization  structure.  The  stages  preceding 
restructuring  are  an  important  and  necessary  aspect  of the  path-dependent  forces 
which  affect  the  probability  of  successfully  achieving  integration,  but  are  not 
18 sufficient.  In  addition,  it  was  not easy for  Alcatel  to  take  the  next  step  of formal 
restructuring, because frustrations  and resistance had been built up due to  a lack of 
attention to implementing and guiding the integration process (both across functions 
and borders). 
In short, management should build the organizational capability and support required 
before and during the implementation of a shift to formal, integrated structures. 
3.3 Start with local initiatives. 
It is  observed  that  early  local  initiatives  were  important  to  long-term  integration 
success.  Local  initiatives  led by  the  staff and  management of local  units  at P&G, 
McKinsey and Company and 3M, for example, began with ad hoc projects and later 
formal task forces or teams managed by various country units. Fred Gluck, from the 
local NY office was in charge of the strategy team which consisted of various other 
strategy experts within McKinsey. The Practice Olympics organization in McKinsey 
is  another example : they had been successfully organized in the German McKinsey 
office and were leveraged worldwide by the MD.  These projects led not just to the 
increased managerial capability noted above, but also allowed each local unit to build 
stronger ties  to other units.  Thus, individual nodes of the future  network began by 
building stronger ties to  other nodes, both with the worldwide and European center, 
and other local units.  This has two types of benefits. First, it ensures that the process 
is  better  supported  and  more  smoothly  implemented.  Second,  it  means  that  other 
linkages,  especially  those  with  real  economic  value  (e.g.  cost  reduction  via 
coordinated  purchasing)  are  also  likely  to  develop  most  actively.  Initial  successes 
motivate local units to push integration forward in  these directions.  As  a result, the 
final  outcome  is  likely  to  be  superior,  with  the  degree  of integration  aligned  to 
demonstrated value-added, rather than a theoretical master plan (a similar result has 
been demonstrated by the procedural justice research within multinationals; Kim and 
Mauborgne, 1996). 
The failed integration processes usually started by trying to implement all the network 
links  at  once,  for  example  through  major  Europe-wide  initiatives  (Bleackley  & 
Williamson,  1995).  This  approach embodied a fundamental  flaw:  it  required local 
units to  contribute to  a process  whereby they  would lose power or give up  locally 
build-up know-how and innovations  (see Alcate1),  yet the benefits they  would gain 
were both unproven and unclear. In  other words: it might be true that you don't talk 
about Christmas to the turkey and you surely can't get it involved voluntarily! 
In contrast to P&G, McKinsey and 3M,  Alcate1  blindly copied the French Trio and 
PLC initiative in the complete Line Transmission Group and has never involved other 
national units in the process. The resistance from the national country managers was 
foreseeable  since they  were  supposed  to  let  their people  work  with  other national 
departments  and hence give up  some of their decision  power,  and  yet  expected to 
evaluate them on their contribution to the local bottom line. 
When initiatives cannot be generated locally, at the very least the benefits and gains of 
the integration should be widely and locally understood.  The authors will add to this 
below in the finding of the importance of commonly perceived business benefits. 
19 3.4 Choose Initiatives that open new options. 
Rather than  seeing  transformation  simply  as  a shift  from  one structure to  another, 
hopefully better, one,  it has  been argued that management must clearly envision the 
desired  future  company,  and  build  the  implications  of that  organization  into  the 
transformation process itself (Muzyka, de Koning and Churchill, 1995). 
The  authors'  research  suggests  two  important  ways  in  which  the  final  goal  of 
integration  should influence  the  process  management  adopts.  First,  in  choosing  an 
integration process managers must consider the need to build managerial capacity for 
the  new  (still  future)  integrated  company,  so  that  once  the  formal  organization 
changes, people within the new structure can work effectively. It is precisely the lack 
of capacity to  deal  with  the  more  complex  structure  of regional  organizations,  the 
authors believe, that causes so many attempts at formally integrating to fail (Alcatel). 
Second,  managers  need  to  take  into  account  the  impact  their  chosen  integration 
process will have on the skill and knowledge base of the company. Some processes 
will result in skills being enhanced, other processes (such as closing down a particular 
function in a national subsidiary) will be skill destroying. As a result, the integration 
process chosen by any company may either expand its future strategic options or close 
them  off.  The  authors  believe  management  must  be  sensitive  to  these  long-term 
implications of the integration process they adopt. Moves that destroy too many skills 
risk  boxing  the  company  into  a  corner.  This  is  especially  dangerous  given  the 
considerable  uncertainty  about  the  rate  of  convergence  imposed  by  external 
developments and the demand for internal capacity for learning in newly restructured 
organizations. 
Management  at  P&G  and  other  companies  also  realized  that  their  organizational 
choices would affect the outcome in  other ways, beyond simply building capabilities 
and knowledge. The flexible commitments in R&D personnel assignments in P&G, 
for example, showed a preference to create options for the future, rather than narrowly 
focusing the marketing strategy6. Creating options and trying to avoid unduly limiting 
future  choices  through  the  integration  process  are  important  considerations  for 
management to be aware of. McKinsey clearly monitored and constantly checked their 
integration  initiatives  in  the  field.  Key  for  them  was  their  flexibility  to  push  the 
integration  one  step  further  or to  first  let  people  get comfortable  with  the  current 
initiative or situation, whenever one of these was necessary and/or possible. 
3.5 Pushing Integration to the Heart of the Business: A Multidimensional 
Perspective 
Management faces the choice of a number of dimensions along which it can push its 
intended (knowledge) integration. Dimensions are defined as proxies of relevant cost 
savings and/or knowledge along which integration is pursued, in the hope to increase 
the cross border efficiency and/or the learning.  Through reviewing the research and 
the popular business press reports, the following options were identified: 
•  geography (e.g. adding a V.-P Europe, or a responsible for a group of countries) 
20 •  functions (integrating R&D, marketing, production, finance, etc.) 
•  processes  (e.g.  cross-border  integration  in  the  context  of  business  process 
reengineering) 
•  activities (or parts of the 'value chain' or 'business system') 
•  products, product categories, brands (e.g. as in category management or Eurobrand 
management) 
•  customer key accounts (e.g. sales) 
•  customer-industry groups (e.g. industry verticals at IBM) 
P&G Europe's  approach  clearly  focused  on  functional  integration  in  the  first  two 
stages.  Later,  they shifted  to  the  product and product category dimensions.  Over 
time,  they  took  an  eclectic  approach  to  integration.  IBM  Europe,  as  part  of a 
worldwide  shake-up  in  1994,  chose  the  customer-industry  groups  as  a  basis  for 
integrating the European operations (internally referred to as industry solution units or 
industry verticals). A dual way was followed by McKinsey: simultaneous efforts on 
the functional and client industry dimensions were initiated. 3M Europe preferred to 
create  European  business  units  around  product  lines,  grouped  in  business  centers, 
inspired by  their traditional  U.S.  structure.  Alcatel  in  its  December  1995  shake-up 
reorganized  into  Business  Divisions  (in  combination  with  geographic  dimension). 
Other companies like Nestle initially took a key account management approach, while 
maintaining national subsidiaries as strong local players (Parsons, 1996). 
In most cases  the  authors  have  observed substantial experimentation  as  integration 
pushed  along  only  one  dimension  (e.g.  on  the  basis  of geography)  got  stranded. 
Therefore a lot of time and frustration could have been saved by carefully evaluating 
and using the different options available. The key issue is not only which dimensions 
for integrating provide the best results, but also, which levers should be pulled in what 
sequence?  How can more leverage be obtained? The authors' research so far has only 
begun to answer some of these questions. 
Identifying the dimensions for long-term integration benefits. 
In selecting a  dimension  along  which  to  push  integration,  management could first 
compare the relative strategic importance of each dimension for the business i.e.  the 
long-term  integration  benefits  it  offers  (even  if these  are  sometimes  difficult  to 
quantify). When trade-offs between those dimensions with long-term benefits have to 
be made, those with immediate impact and those which act as  "enablers" in laying a 
foundation for integration on other dimensions are suggested. 
For  example,  in  the case of accounting  and  information  technology,  integration  is 
often necessary in order to provide the necessary support systems for  integration on 
other dimensions. This category of initiatives, depicted as "A" in Figure 4, will act as 
enablers by facilitating cross-border comparison of information and coordination of 
activities.  This  category  of integration  initiatives  may  also  offer  substantial  cost 
savings. But they are unlikely to have a broad-based impact on people's mind set and 
skills,  nor to  fundamentally  alter  the  strategic  positioning of the  company  towards 
global or pan-European competition. 
21 On  the  other  hand,  integrating  on  a  critical  dimension  and  changing performance 
measurements  to  highlight the  change can have  a powerful,  direct  impact on  both 
mindset and strategic positioning. These are  termed category "B" initiatives (Figure 
4).  For  instance,  if a  consultancy  company  like  McKinsey  observes  that  industry 
expert consultants  will  be  key  for  future  success,  the  installation  of the  Clientele 
Sectors  will  be a strong sign of the changes  in  'the  way  business  is  done'.  In fact, 
McKinsey chose client industry as  a key dimension not only because the pressure for 
integration came from there, but also as  a proxy for  relevant knowledge, a key asset 









Business Benefit vs. Integration Benefit: Tradeoffs May Be Necessary 
Ideally,  one  should  begin  by  trying  to  identify  those  opportumtIes  that  will  push 
integration along dimensions that offer both substantial business benefits while at the 
same time acting as integration enablers (category "C" in Figure 4). When a trade-off 
exists (as in A vs. B) and cannot be overcome (by finding initiatives of type C or by 
combining both types A and B at the same time), it is important that management be 
explicit and realistic about its  choice and what  it entails.  Given  that fundamental 
(economic)  benefits  are  the  ultimate  goal  of integration,  category  "B"  should  be 
preferred over A. But there will be instances where unless category "A" initiatives are 
undertaken as enablers, the whole process will be impeded (e.g. Alcate1's attempt to 
coordinate activities and knowledge across borders initially failed partly because of a 
lack of overall structural support by HRM, etc.).  This is the trade-off which is often 
hardest to resolve in reality. The situation is even more complex in a dynamic context, 
as  the  actual  critical  dimensions  in  the  business  may  change  over  time  since  the 
22 industry or the company evolves. However, realizing what the terms of the trade-off 
are in any particular case goes a long way towards managing it properly. 
Maximizing integration spill-overs through a multi-dimensional approach. 
Integration is rarely achieved in a single sweep, along one dimension of the business. 
Building critical  mass  and  creating  spill-overs  of integration  benefits  are  the  next 
requirement that is essential to achieve significant and lasting integration. This means 
that  integration  initiatives  may  have  to  be  sponsored  on  many  dimensions  of the 
business simultaneously, guided by a common, long-term goal. 
P&G, with their slow and steady process of integration, clearly showed how initiatives 
along  several  dimensions  in  the  business  helped  to  create  the  highly  integrated 
organization of today. The benefit of combining dimensions were twofold.  First, by 
promoting  initiatives  on  many  dimensions,  management  built  a  critical  mass  of 
strategic  awareness  and  cross-national  relationships.  Thus,  by  electing  to  create 
change along those dimensions, management built support for integration and avoided 
needless  battles.  Second,  the  organizational capabilities  required  to  cope with  the 
complexity of an integrated European operation are quite different than those needed 
for  the  loose  federation  of country  subsidiaries.  By  taking  initiatives  along  many 
dimensions  of the  business,  management  allowed  themselves  and  others  to  learn 
needed skills - before the final integrated structure were implemented.  These kinds of 
spill-overs from specific initiatives were essential to the overall process. Progress on 
anyone dimension  of integration  is  leveraged  or  reinforced  through  following  a 
parallel integration path along other dimensions. 
McKinsey and  Company felt  market pressure for  increasing  knowledge integration 
along the client sector dimension. However, from the very beginning, it was clear that 
the functional dimension was not to be neglected. Gupta's comment that the company 
should try all ways simultaneously clearly illustrates the multidimensional approach. 
The exponential integration process exemplifies the need to build up a certain critical 
mass before taking off at a higher pace. 
3.6 Starting with initiatives giving short-term benefits. 
The multi-dimensional nature of the initiatives demonstrates that there are many paths 
to integration, but success is  also driven by practical short-term concerns. In addition 
to  assessing the long term contribution towards  integration of moving forward on  a 
particular dimension, one should also evaluate initiatives on the basis of the extent to 
which they offer early, quantifiable benefits ('quick wins'). The findings here were in 
accordance  with  the  change  management  and  transformation  literature  which  has 
emphasized the  importance  of quick  wins  to  rally  support for  the  overall  process 
(Kotter, 1995). 
For example at McKinsey and Company, the pressure for more integration came from 
the customer who preferred industry specialists for their consultancy projects. In light 
of this, the short term benefit was especially evident on the client industry dimension. 
Another example in the same company were  the local consultants who experienced 
immediately the benefits of the  PDNet system.  This computerized center of know-
23 how  had clear short term benefits  in  the  way  consultants  gathered information  and 
know-how for their individual projects. 
Alcatel's  problems  in  implementing  the  Trio  and  PLC  on  a  national  level  can  be 
considered  as  an  'early  lose',  since  they  only  fed  the  conviction  of the  country 
managers that these concepts could not work (and especially not internationally) and 
were not optimal. 
As  part of the overall integration process, therefore, management should ensure they 
adopt at least some integration initiatives along dimensions that provide clear, ideally 
quantifiable,  benefits  (hard  to  accomplish  for  knowledge  integration)  that  can  be 
realized in the short term. 
The  demonstrable,  short-term  benefit  does  not  necessarily  need  to  be  financial  in 
nature. In many instances the organization can rally behind other commonly perceived 
business goals, as long as they are clear, represent a true challenge and have a sense of 
urgency.  Responding to a commonly perceived competitive threat, for example, may 
provide a strong impetus to the integration process (e.g. McKinsey and Company). In 
sum,  management should  give  priority  to  integration  initiatives  built  around  focal 
points based on a commonly perceived, specific business need. 
Given the limits and dangers  of a pure short term perspective, the importance of a 
longer term view is indicated below. 
3.7 Top commitment to overall long term vision. 
No matter how careful management considers the previous points, most benefits will 
not be apparent in the short term. It is clear that top commitment and a shared vision 
are essential in order to  make the kinds of fundamental changes to an  organization's 
logic and the functioning as  those required to achieve integration. Both of these pre-
requisites  need  to  be  long-term  and  sustained  over  a  substantial  period  of time, 
especially when the "slow and  steady"  route  to  integration is  chosen.  But even  if 
shock therapy is  attempted, continued commitment and shared vision will be crucial 
in making the necessary behavioral  and cultural changes  after the drastic  structural 
changes  have  been  initiated.  McKinsey  and  Company's  internal  champion  of the 
knowledge  integration  process,  Fred Gluck,  illustrates  the  contribution  of constant 
attention and support and empowerment for the integration initiatives. 
Conflicts  and  resistance  are  bound  to  arise  and  top  management must assume the 
delicate role of leading the change and empowering the key players or champions in 
the organization to push the changes through.  Important adjustments will have to be 
made in reward systems, P&L rysponsibility, reporting lines, career development etc. 
For example, McKinsey in  adapted the career and appraisal systems for  specialized 
consultants while Alcatel's problems in the integration process were partly due to lack 
of support through P&L responsibility and reward systems. Hard business decisions, 
often involving trading  off short term benefit for  long term  gains,  will  have  to  be 
faced.  Here, like in any strategy process, top management will have to set and manage 
the context,  and  arbitrate or intervene clearly and decisively  whenever conflicts  or 
paralyzing ambiguities arise. 
24 The nature of this commitment and top level intervention may be somewhat different 
for the "slow and steady" and "shock therapy" routes to integration. Under the shock 
therapy approach, where the change is pushed through in a crisis context, a substantial 
change in top management itself is likely required, especially if the crisis is externally 
imposed, as was the case with IBM and Alcatel. If  you can't change the people,  move 
them! 
The  importance of shared  vision  and  top  commitment  is  all  the  greater  whenever 
benefits of the integration are not immediate and easily quantifiable or demonstrable, 
as  unfortunately is  often the case for knowledge integration. But even if the benefits 
seem clear, the impacts of the required changes on the overall organization are likely 
to require top management attention to the process. 
At one company (which had chosen a cross-border alliance route towards European 
integration),  cross-border functional  task  forces  or activity  groups  which  aimed  at 
improving mutual cross border learning, often got stuck despite initial enthusiasm as 
tough  decisions  and  cross  border  trade-off had  to  be  made,  the  problem  was  the 
absence of clear top  management  authority over the  various  country organizations, 
which de facto retained a high degree of independence. 
4. Conclusion 
Previous  research  has  emphasized various  aspects  of integration  management.  The 
authors' initial research flagged the fact that the process a firm chooses to transform 
itself into a more integrated network organization proved important for two reasons. 
First, because the integration process a firm adopts significantly alters the probability 
that increased integration will be successfully achieved.  Second, the final  outcome 
itself is  path  dependent,  that  is  the  type  of integration  a  firm  achieves  depends 
significantly on the process (or path) it chooses to follow. It seems that applying this 
specifically to knowledge integration does not affect these observations. 
Based on  the  findings  on  overall  company  integration,  a  framework  is  developed 
which  emphasizes  the  options  facing  managers,  relating  existing  organizational 
structure, change culture, and market conditions to the optimal or effective choice of 
integration processes. In this paper, it is  tested to  what extent the process approach 
applies  to  explicit  cross  border  knowledge  integration.  It  is  observed  that  the 
management  of the  knowledge  integration  process  remains  crucial  for  successful 
integration. The key conclusions are that the long-term (slow  and  steady) processes 
are preferable to medium-term ones; that a preparation phase which builds integration 
capabilities  remains  crucial  to  success;  that  integration  efforts  should  combine 
initiatives that directly drive long-term success with those that can act as "enablers" to 
more fundamental types of integration. It is also suggested beginning the process with 
focused  and  quick-return  initiatives  and  combining  integration  initiatives  along 
multiple dimensions of the business increases the probability of success. 
Some of the initial observations apply possibly even more to  knowledge integration 
pushing cross border learning than to overall integration efforts that push cross border 
efficiency. The need to build trust and to involve people, the suggestion to prepare the 
25 company and build an appropriate coordination culture, and others, have played a key 
role in the  observations of the  success  or failure  of the  integration  initiatives.  The 
question remains however whether the  'shock therapy'  in making the transition, can 
work for  leveraging globally or regionally  the  learning  and  knowledge  within  the 
organization. 
The question  is  most often  not whether integration  should be established either to 
increase the global efficiency or to leverage innovation and know-how internationally. 
It seems that integration initiatives to boost the regional and global efficiency of the 
company are frequently in close interaction with cross border knowledge integration 
attempts.  In  some  businesses,  especially  the  multi-domestic  businesses,  and 
companies, the integration is particularly aiming at better overall leveraging of know-
how,  while  in  other  businesses  and  companies  the  key  focus  is  on  the  global 
efficiency. It seems that for the  first  kind of industries  and  companies,  integration 
along  the  knowledge  dimension  strongly  supports  or  even  initiates  better  overall 
integration; while for the second kind of industries and companies, the integration of 
the  knowledge  is  at  least  a  by-product  but  often  also  a  'catalyst'  for  the  overall 
integration. 
Given the complexity and diversity of the markets, not to mention the fastly changing 
technological and regulatory environment (e.g.  the European integration), companies 
experience  increasing  pressure  on  their  knowledge  creation,  management  and 
integration. Although a recent stream of research has embarked on this evolution, the 
authors hope that their findings can contribute to the insight that the integration of the 
company  knowledge  sources  across  borders  is  a  complex  process  that  should  be 
monitored, planned and managed carefully. 
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